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3.1  Introduction 
Local government  in  the  United States is a multitiered  structure. 
The purpose  of this study is to investigate the effects of  alternative 
local government structures on aggregate local public debt and expen- 
ditures. These effects are dominated  by  two opposing  principles  of 
efficiency. First, larger-and,  therefore, fewer-governments  may cap- 
ture economies  of scale in the production and distribution of local public 
goods. Second, smaller and more plentiful governments may provide 
a greater variety of public good bundles, and, therefore, healthy com- 
petition for each other. 
Both of these principles have implications for the optimal structure 
of local government. Unfortunately, the implications of  each have be- 
come, for the most part, competitive rather than complementary pre- 
scriptions.  The first  principle  has been compelling to  specialists  in 
public administration, the second to economists. In consequence, the 
public administration program for local government reform consists of 
local government consolidation. The economists’ program consists of 
fragmentation. 
This  study demonstrates that both  principles are operative in  the 
determination  of aggregate county public  debt and  expenditure (the 
sums of debt and expenditures for all governments within a county, 
including the county itself) as shares of total county personal income. 
Jeffrey S. Zax is an assistant  professor  of economics at Queens College and at the 
Graduate Center of  the City University of  New York, and a research  economist at the 
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Aggregate debt and expenditures are positive functions of jurisdictions 
per capita, suggesting that small jurisdictions are inefficient. However, 
they are negative functions of jurisdictions per dollar of government 
expenditure,  suggesting  that  when  jurisdictions have  large  average 
“market shares,” they use their monopoly power to expand the local 
public sector. In addition, agggregate debt and expenditures are neg- 
ative functions of the absolute number of governments. For the most 
part, these results also characterize the effects of surrounding juris- 
dictions on city government debt and expenditures. 
The structure of local government within counties is less important 
than the number of units. The income share of local government debt 
is, in general, sensitive to the number of local jurisdictions but not to 
their types. However, the income share of government  expenditures 
is significantly more sensitive to the numbers of municipalities than to 
the numbers of single-purpose school and special districts. 
These results  imply, unsurprisingly,  that neither consolidation  nor 
fragmentation is unambiguously superior. In a system of general-purpose 
local governments, neither the extreme ofjurisdictions which are many, 
small, competitive, and inefficient nor that of jurisdictions which are 
few,  large,  efficient,  and  monopolistic  will  minimize  debt  and 
expenditures. 
As policy, both consolidation and fragmentation may be inferior to 
a third strategy in which single-purpose governments are more prom- 
inent. Both programs, implicitly, advocate fewer tiers of local govern- 
ment. Under consolidation, tiers are subsumed into a single county- 
or  metropolitan-area-wide government. Under fragmentation,  multiunit 
single-purpose districts  are decomposed into single units.  However, 
the intermediate  tier of single-purpose jurisdictions may be essential 
to the best compromise between economies of scale and competitive 
supply. 
3.2  Consolidation and Fragmentation 
The 50  states of  America  are, with  few exceptions, divided  into 
counties which in aggregate exhaust state territory. These counties are 
the top tier of local government. County territory is, in turn, exhausted 
by jurisdictions which provide primary and secondary education. These 
jurisdictions are most  often  single-purpose  school districts. Within 
counties, centers of  population  are incorporated as general-purpose 
municipalities. They occasionally include primary and secondary ed- 
ucation  among their functions. Sewerage, water,  transit, and other 
services may be provided by single-purpose special districts, usually 
within  counties, but to areas which  include more than one general- 
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For the most part, the positive theory of this system addresses the 
number and types of jurisdictions separately. Multiple jurisdictions are 
beneficial because they restrict the opportunities for monopoly behav- 
ior by local government officials.  However, they also restrict the op- 
portunities  to  take  advantage  of  returns  to  scale  in  government 
production and to redistribute wealth. Single-purpose jurisdictions are 
beneficial  because they reduce the power of general-purpose govern- 
ments. However, they increase the complexity of local government, 
which  may create fiscal illusions under which  citizens accept higher 
debt levels than  they would  if  the costs and benefits  of government 
were more readily calculable. 
Fragmented local jurisdictions are beneficial because they offer cit- 
izens choice among different collections of local public goods. If few 
alternative jurisdictions are available, inefficient jurisdictions need not 
fear the sanctions which could potentially be imposed by taxpayer and 
tax base emigration.  Public  officials, whose personal  objectives are 
served by bigger government (Niskanen 1975), can expand government 
activity beyond levels which would be acceptable to voters if the “mar- 
ket” in local public services were more “complete.” 
If the variety of available jurisdictions is sufficient, citizen mobility 
may  render inconsequential  the geographic  monopoly  held  by  each 
jurisdiction  within its own borders (Tiebout  1956). In the absence of 
intrajurisdictional politics (citizen voice), the monopoly power of in- 
dividual jurisdictions is inversely related to the number of jurisdictions. 
However, with fixed jurisdictional  boundaries (land is immobile), cit- 
izen exit will not entirely deprive local governments of monopoly power, 
regardless of the number of alternative jurisdictions (Epple and Zelenitz 
1981). 
The advantages of sufficient jurisdictional choice are relevant to many 
issues in government organization.  For example, annexations reduce 
the potential alternatives to the annexing jurisdiction, and may there- 
fore permit higher  expenditures (Mehay 198 I).  Municipal  incorpora- 
tions dilute the monopoly power of existing municipalities. This effect 
is explicitly recognized in the statutes of 18  states, where new munic- 
ipalities are prohibited within  specified distances of  existing munici- 
palities (ACIR  1982). Where existing municipalities can prevent new 
incorporations, incorporations may be less frequent and expenditures 
by existing municipalities higher (Martin and Wagner 1978). Revenue- 
or tax-base-sharing reduces competition among jurisdictions by insu- 
lating individual jurisdictions  from  changes in  their  tax base.  Here 
again, expenditures may increase (McKenzie and Staaf 1978). 
Despite the appeal of competition through multiple jurisdictions, the 
case for fragmentation is not conclusive. Large jurisdictions may cap- 
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(Rothenberg 1975; ACIR 1975). In addition, small jurisdictions cannot 
effectively  redistribute  wealth,  since  intrajurisdictional  variation  in 
wealth would be small and adverse selection easy (Reschovsky 1980). 
If  large units of local government are more efficient than small units, 
consolidation, rather than fragmentation, will reduce the size of local 
government. 
Though recent  theoretical  considerations of local government pre- 
dominantly  present arguments in  favor  of fragmentation,’ the argu- 
ments in favor of consolidation  are consequential. Presentations for 
either position  do not  so much contradict as ignore each other. For 
example, most models of local government monopoly assume constant 
or decreasing returns to scale (Epple and Zelenitz  1981; Wagner and 
Weber 1975). 
Studies which consider the advantages of both small- and large-scale 
local government are rare and speculative: Martin and McKenzie hy- 
pothesize  that citizens will  not benefit from the efficiencies available 
through consolidation because the bureaucracy, whose monopoly power 
is enhanced by  consolidation,  will  appropriate all  the gains.  Mullen 
hypothesizes that fragmentation is a luxury good, “bought” by wealth- 
ier citizens at the cost of inefficiency in order to enjoy local autonomy. 
Empirically,  local  government debt and  expenditures must  be mini- 
mized for a given  level  of  services when  local jurisdictions strike a 
careful balance between the efficiency of large units and the competitive 
vulnerability  of small units. 
Similarly, within  the system of  local governments, single-purpose 
jurisdictions may either reduce or expand local government activity. 
To  the extent that they  increase the numbers of local governments, 
they contribute to the competitive pressures all face. In this role, they 
reduce  aggregate local  government  expenditures for a given level of 
services (Wagner and Weber 1975; Mehay  1984). 
However, single-purpose governments also complicate the structure 
of local government. If this creates a fiscal illusion among citizens as 
to the true tax price of the local services they receive, single-purpose 
jurisdictions may allow aggregate government activity to expand be- 
yond the limits that would be set by an electorate which fully under- 
stood their effects (DiLorenzo 1982). The principle purpose of special 
districts may be to circumvent statutory limits on general obligation 
debt of general-purpose  governments (Copeland  1961 ; Wagner  1976; 
Eppel and Spatt 1986). 
The arguments for and against consolidation  are also relevant. If 
single-purpose jurisdictions obtain economies of scale that are unat- 
tainable by the general-purpose governments they serve (ACIR 1982), 
they reduce the size of local government. If they are so big as  to replace 
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tional monopolies, bureaucratic self-interest may lead to an expansion 
of the local public sector. This danger is enhanced by the structure of 
many  special districts, whose  officials  are appointed by  the general 
purpose governments they serve and are, therefore, isolated from the 
electorate. 
Arguments in favor of both reductions and expansions of local gov- 
ernment through  single-purpose jurisdictions are appealing.  Empiri- 
cally, they present a challenge to identify both the competitive, efficient, 
and the monopolizing, illusory effects of single-purpose jurisdictions. 
3.3  Numbers and Types of Local Jurisdictions 
Government hierarchies  within  county-level jurisdictions provide 
comparisons which test for the public finance effects of differences in 
local government  organization.  Comparisons across counties are ap- 
propriate for three reasons. First, counties are large enough to contain 
structures of smaller jurisdictions. Second, they are small enough to 
permit Tiebout-style  sorting by  potential  residents. Third, and most 
important, the aggreggate  of  services provided  by  counties and the 
jurisdictions they contain typically make up the complete array of local 
services available to county residents. Comparisons across counties, 
within states, can conveniently account for differences in service arrays. 
There are approximately 3,130 county-level governments in the United 
States.* Among them are examples of almost all degrees of local gov- 
ernment fragmentation and consolidation. Seventeen counties contain 
no local   government^.^  Five  counties contain  more  than  200.  Cook 
County, Illinois, is the most fragmented in terms of jurisdiction counts, 
with 513 local jurisdictions. 
However, Cook County also has more than five million residents, or 
approximately one jurisdiction  per 1,000. In per capita terms, at least 
25  percent  of all counties are more fragmented. Residents in  Slope 
County, North Dakota, are most generously endowed, with 27.6 juris- 
dictions per 1,000  residents. Slope County also has the smallest average 
jurisdictions, in  financial  terms: 27.1 jurisdictions per  $1,000,000 in 
aggregate local government expenditures. 
In contrast, the greatest geographic densities are in eastern states. 
Bergen and Hudson, counties in New Jersey directly across the Hudson 
river from New York City, both have more than 0.6 jurisdictions per 
square mile. Table 3.  I  presents the entire distribution of jurisdictions 
per  county,  per square mile,  per  1,000 county population,  and  per 
$1,000,000 aggregate expenditure. 
Table 3.2  presents distributions of cities and towns per county, special 
districts per county, and school districts per county. Seventy-six coun- 
ties contain only cities or towns. Eighty-five percent of counties have 84  Jeffrey S.  Zax 
Table 3.1  Distribution of Counties by Jurisdictions, Jurisdictions per Square 
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governments of all three types. Cook County has the most cities and 
towns, 150, and the most special districts, 152. Harris County, Texas, 
has 348 school districts. Slope County, again, has the most cities and 
towns per  1,000 capita, with  slightly  over 20.  Loving County’s one 
special  district  amounts  to  10.9  special  districts per  1,000 capita. 
McPherson County, Nebraska, has 13.4 school districts per 1  ,OOO  capita. 
As tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate, few counties match these extreme 
jurisdiction numbers, by any measure. However, by any measure, the 
variation in jurisdiction numbers across counties is striking. Further- 
more, counties vary dramatically in the mix of municipalities, special 
districts, and school districts they contain. They therefore provide an 
appropriate sample in which to investigate the effects of the tier-structure 
of local government on the size of the local public sector. 
3.4  Local Jurisdictions and Aggregate County Public Finance 
Comparisons of aggregate debt levels, debt changes, and expenditure 
levels across counties reveal the effects of local government structure 
on agggregate local public finance. If small, competitive jurisdictions 
are most efficient, counties with many jurisdictions  will have smaller 
aggregate local public sector debt and expenditure levels than counties 
with few, for any level of public services. If large-scale government is 
efficient, their debt and expenditure levels will be higher.4 Though the 
theories  which  support fragmentation  and consolidation  are not  ex- 
plicitly  dynamic, the relationship  between  efficiency  and  growth  in 
aggregate local public sector debt may also be negative. 
Following Gordon and Slemrod (19861, debt is measured here as a 
fraction of aggregate county personal  income,  both gross and net of 
sinking,  bond, and insurance funds. Their econometric specification 
for debt determination  also forms the basis for tests of government 
structure effects. In their regression model, debt is a linear function of 
imputed marginal tax rates, the proportion of adults aged 25 to 44, the 
proportion of adults greater than 60 years old, the percentage of house- 
holds  which changed housing units between  1975 and  1980, the per- 
centage  of  households  which  changed  county of  residence between 
1975 and 1980, the percentage of housing units with renter occupants, 
the percentage  of housing units constructed between 1975 and  1980, 
and dummy variables for state. Gordon and Slemrod use these variables 
to capture variations in population characteristics and in tastes for local 
public goods across counties. Here, a  variable measuring the inter- 
quartile range  of the  1980 within-county family  income  distribution 
provides additional controls for heterogeneity in county populations. 
Gordon and Slemrod  apply  this  model  to a  sample  consisting  of 
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federal income taxation on arbitrage through the local  public sector. 
This study applies it to a sample of 3,129 observations, each repre- 
senting aggregate local governmental activity within the borders of a 
single county-level government, to determine the effects of government 
structure on government size. Accordingly,  a dummy variable repre- 
senting counties in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA’s), 
a vector of dummy variables representing local provision of 22 different 
 service^,^ and measures of the number and type of within-county ju- 
risdictions augment the Gordon/Slemrod specification.h 
The same specification  is  used  here for equations which  estimate 
county aggregate local  public  expenditures and the  1982 fiscal  year 
change in long-term debt, as proportions of aggregate county personal 
income. This is a convenient specification for debt changes, as a com- 
parison to equations for debt levels. It is also similar to the canonical 
expenditure  specifications  of  Borcherding  and  Deacon  (1986)  and 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) though not identical .’ 
In this specification, coefficients  on the jurisdiction  measures test 
the effects  of  consolidation  and fragmentation.  In  principle, finance 
measures and jurisdiction  counts may  be  mutually  dependent. The 
decision to create new or combine old jurisdictions can depend on the 
expected effects of these changes on local public services and finance. 
Unfortunately, the effects of finance choices on  jurisdiction structure 
are ambiguous. For example, a population with strong tastes and high 
expenditures for local public services may fragment their county so as 
to provide many specialized bundles of public goods, or consolidate 
so as to efficiently provide  large  quantities of  “commodity”  public 
services. 
In  practice, this  issue is occasionally  important. In  some periods 
jurisdictional  structures have  been quite flexible.  Between  1962 and 
1972, the number of local jurisdictions in the United States fell by 14.2 
percent, from 91,186 to 78,218. This reduction  was confined entirely 
to school districts, whose numbers fell by 54.5 percent. Numbers of 
counties, cities, and townships were virtually constant, while numbers 
of special districts grew by 30.4 percent (ACIR 1982). 
Local government structure has recently been less malleable. Since 
1972 local government numbers have changed little, growing by only 
5.2 percent. Municipality counts have grown by only 3.0 percent, town- 
ship counts have fallen by 1.5 percent, school district counts have fallen 
by 5.9 percent, and special district counts have grown by 19.7 percent 
(ACIR 1982; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1984). 
Despite the theoretical  connection, effects of public finance on ju- 
risdiction structure are certainly negligible in the sample studied here. 
Jurisdictional counts by county in 1982, the year under study, are almost 
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counts achieve R2s of .95 for special districts, and greater than .99 for 
cities,  towns, and  school  districts.x Given  1977 jurisdiction counts, 
there is very little variance left to 1982 counts which could depend on 
public finance choices in all the’intervening years, much less in  1982. 
Table 3.3 presents equations for gross and net debt levels, debt changes 
and expenditure shares in aggregate income as  functions of the number 
and squared number of jurisdictions in the county.’  Increases in juris- 
Table 3.3  Equations for Aggregate County Debt and Total Expenditure Shares in Total 
Personal Income with Jurisdiction Counts 
Change, 
Gross  Net  County  Total 
Independent  County  County  Long-term  County 
Variable  Debt  Debt  Debt  Expenditure 
Number of local jurisdictions 
Number of local jurisdictions 
lnterquartile range. family 
Marginal federal income tax 
Marginal federal income tax 
Marginal state income tax 
Marginal state income tax 
Percentage of adult 
Percentage of adult 
in county 
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Percentage structures built 
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dictions per county reduce levels of all four dependent variables with 
1 percent  significance. In terms of jurisdiction  counts, fragmentation 
reduces the aggregate  size of  the local  public  sector. This result  is 
consistent with  the  hypothesis  that  monopolizing  bureaucrats have 
greater power in larger jurisdictions.'0 
This effect  diminishes as jurisdiction  numbers increase.  Quadratic 
terms in jurisdiction  counts are positive,  significant at 5  percent for 
total expenditures and the change in long-term debt, and at 10 percent 
for gross debt. Together,  the linear and quadratic terms imply that, 
within state, and with given functions and population characteristics, 
the income share of total local government expenditures is minimized 
with 290 jurisdictions per county. Holding these factors constant, this 
share is 12.2 percentage points smaller with 290 jurisdictions per county 
than with 25, the average value across counties. All other explanatory 
variables constant, gross debt is minimized  with 272 jurisdictions and 
the change in long-term debt is minimized with 242. As noted above, 
few counties actually contain this many local jurisdictions. 
Section 3.3 introduced three measures of jurisdiction density in ad- 
dition to absolute  jurisdiction counts. Table 3.4  presents the coefficients 
Table 3.4  Coefficients for Various Jurisdiction Measures in Equations for 
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Jurisdictions per $I ,000,000  -  .  I24  -.I07 
expenditures  (5.33)  (5.09) 
Jurisdictions per $I .000,000  ,00459  ,0038  I 
expenditures, squared  (3.2 I)  (2.95) 
R2  ,111  .I04 





~  ,0239 




Jurisdictions per square  -1.16  -  ,958  -  ,927  -  ,166 
mile  (I  ,781  (1.64)  (2.68)  (1.29) 
Jurisdictions per square  I .30  1.1 I  1.15  .  I22 
mile, squared  (1.31)  (1.24)  (2.18)  (.615) 
R'  ,102  ,0963  .0735  ,225 
Jurisdictions per 1.000  -.0152  -  .0280  -  ,0123  .02  12 
capita  (.690)  (1.41)  ( I .05)  (4.86) 
capita, squared  (.194)  (. 192)  (.227)  (3.51) 
R?  ,102  ,0970  ,072  1  ,231 
Jurisdictions per 1,000  -  .000255  .Om227  .OW159  -  ,000916 
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estimated for jurisdictions per 1,000 capita, per square mile, and per 
$1,000,000 government expenditures, when each replaces absolute ju- 
risdiction counts in the specification of table 3.3.  I’ 
Regression equations achieve higher explanatory power with juris- 
dictions measured  per $1,000,000 expenditures than with  any of the 
other three “normalizations.”  All linear terms and three quadratic terms 
are significant at 1 percent, the remaining quadratic term at 5 percent. 
Consistent with  the results  in  table  3.3, increasing jurisdictions per 
$1,000,000 expenditures-in  effect,  reducing jurisdictional  “market 
share”-reduces  the income share  of local public debt and expenditures 
at a diminishing rate. 
Jurisdictional normalizations with land area are less successful, but 
consistent.  In all four equations, the linear coefficient on jurisdictions 
per square mile has a negative, and the quadratic term a positive sign. 
However, only two of these coefficients are significant at 5 percent, 
with a third significant at  10 percent. 
Linear coefficients  on jurisdictions  per  1,000 capita are similarly 
negative in all debt equations, but insignificant. Two of three quadratic 
terms in these equations are positive, but again all three are insignifi- 
cant. Both coefficients are significant in the expenditure equation, but 
here signs are reversed. The income share of local government expen- 
ditures appears to increase at a  diminishing  rate as the number of 
governments per capita increases. In effect, increases in the population 
served reduce the local government share in income. 
This last result is the only indication in the equations of tables 3.3 
and 3.4 that jurisdiction  numbers may have efficiency as well as mo- 
nopoly effects. Equations which contain only one measure of jurisdic- 
tion density cannot identify both. Equations which contain linear and 
quadratic terms for two or more measures suggest that both effects are 
important in the determination of public finance income shares. 
Among the four measures of jurisdiction  density, there are eleven 
different combinations of two or more. Each measure performs con- 
sistently in all equations which include combinations of which it is a 
part. Linear coefficients  on absolute jurisdiction  numbers and juris- 
dictions per $1,000,000 are invariably negative and usually significant. 
Quadratic coefficients on these two are significantly positive.  Linear 
and quadratic coefficients on jurisdictions per 1,000 capita are positive 
and negative, respectively, and often significant. In combination with 
other measures, linear and quadratic Coefficients on jurisdictions per 
square mile are rarely significant. 
Table 3.5 presents equation estimates for the specification which best 
represents these effects. It includes linear and quadratic terms for all 
measures of jurisdiction density with the exception of jurisdictions per 
square mile. Linear and quadratic terms for jurisdictions per square 
mile are insignificant when added to this specification. 90  Jeffrey S.  Zax 
Table 3.5  Equations for Aggregate  County Debt and Total Expenditure Shares in 
Total Personal Income with Multiple Jurisdiction Measures 
Independent 
Variable 
Change,  Total 
Gross  Net  County  County 
County  County  Long-term  Expen- 
Debt  Debt  Debt  ditures 
Number of local 
Number of local 
jurisdictions in county 
jurisdictions in county, 
squared 
Jurisdiction per  I ,OOO  capita 
Jurisdictions per 1  ,OOO 
capita, squared 
Jurisdictions per $I ,000,OOO 
expenditures 
Jurisdictions per $I ,OOO,OOO 
expenditures, squared 
lnterquartile range, family 
income distribution 
Marginal federal income tax 
rate 
Marginal federal income tax 
rate, squared 
Marginal state income tax 
rate 
Marginal state income tax 
rate, squared 
Percentage of adult 
population aged 25-44 
Percentage of adult 
population aged 61 or 
more 
Percentage in same house as 
1975 
Percentage in same county, 
different house as 1975 
Percentage in rental units 
Percentage structures built 
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The effects of jurisdictions per $I ,000,000 are again consistent with 
those predicted by the competitive model of fragmentation. In all four 
equations, linear coefficients for jurisdictions per $I ,000,000 are neg- 
ative, quadratic terms are negative, and all coefficients are significant 
at  1  percent. Minimum debt and expenditure income shares occur in 
the range of 9.6 to 10.  I  governments per $1,000,000 expenditure. 
Absolute jurisdiction  counts have  similar, but weaker effects.  The 
linear coefficient on counts is always negative, significant at 1 percent 
for the change in long-term debt and total expenditures and at 10 percent 
for gross debt. Quadratic terms are all positive, but only that for the 
change in long-term debt is significant, at 10 percent. Accepting point 
estimates for both  linear and  quadratic effects, minimum  debt and 
expenditure income shares occur in the approximate range of  250 to 
330 governments per county. 
As demonstrated in section 3.3, very few counties attain these income- 
share-minimizing levels of fragmentation. The coefficients on jurisdic- 
tions per 1,000 capita indicate that one reason for this failure may be 
that fragmentation at this level creates inefficiencies in public service 
production, as well as market efficiencies associated with competition. 
All linear coefficients for this measure are positive, all quadratic coef- 
ficients are negative, and all are significant at  I  percent. With respect 
to population served, local  public debt and income shares are maxi- 
mized in the range of 8.8 to 10.7 governments per 1,000 capita.'* With 
a positive  correlation between absolute jurisdiction  numbers, county 
population,  and absolute size of the  local  public  sector, jurisdiction 
densities that minimize public sector income shares  along the dimension 
of jurisdiction counts and market shares maximize them along the di- 
mension of population served. 
The results of tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 are robust to many assumptions 
about local  public  finance.  In  particular,  they  do not  depend upon 
counties  of extreme size in the sample.  The specifications in these tables 
produce identical results when applied to the subsample of counties 
with populations between one thousand and one milli~n.'~ 
However, equations calculated on the original sample, with separate 
measures of jurisdiction  density for counties of greater than and less 
than 10,000 population, suggest that the effects of jurisdiction density 
may  differ between  small and  large counties. Equations with  single 
measures of jurisdiction  density  suggest, for example, that fragmen- 
tation reduces the income share of total government expenditures in 
only counties with populations which exceed 10,000. 
Table  3.6 presents coefficients  on jurisdiction  measures from esti- 
mates of the specification of table 3.5, with  interactions between all 
three jurisdiction  measures and county size class. These coefficients 
indicate that effects in the two different county size classes are similar 92  Jeffrey S. Zax 





Gross  Net  County  Total 
County  County  Long-term  County 
Debt  Debt  Debt  Expenditure 
Coiinties wifh  mnrc’  thun 10,000 popularion: 
Number of local jurisdictions 
Number of  local jurisdictions 
-  ,00212 
in county  (I .60) 
.000003  58 
in county, squared  (.924) 
Jurisdictions per 1,000 capita  .743 
Jurisdictions per 1.000  -  .I02 
(6.64) 
capita, squared  (4.63) 
Jurisdictions per $1,000,000  -  .820 
expenditures  (7.70) 
Jurisdictions per $I ,000.000  .I07 
expenditures, squared  (5.01) 
Coiinties with less thun 10,000 population: 
Number of local jurisdictions 
Number of local jurisdictions 
Jurisdictions per 1,000 capita 
in county 
in county, squared 
Jurisdictions per 1,000 
capita. squared 
Jurisdictions per $I ,000.OOO 
expenditures 
Jurisdictions per $I ,000,000 
expenditures. Squared 
R’ 
F-tests und degrees of 
jiwdom  for ryucility of 
c,ffi,cts across county 
population  ilassc.s: 
Jurisdictions counts (2,3033) 
Jurisdictions per 1,000 capita 
(2,3033) 
Juristicion per $1,000,000 
expenditures (2,3033) 




~  .0000483 
(.329) 
i.551) 
.22  I 
(4.49) 
-  .0110 
(3.37) 
-  ,314 




.22  I 
(302) 
(.0001) 















-  .658 









-  ,0000722 
-  .00667 
-  ,224 
,0103 









-  .OOl60 
(2.26) 
.000003  15 
(1.51) 
.  I17 
(I  ,951 











(3.1  I) 












(.  176) 
,740 
(.617) 
-  .000674 
(2.69) 




-  ,031  I 
(7.43) 

























Nore: r-statistics  are in  parentheses  below  coefficients.  Significance levels are in  parentheses 
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in  direction and significance, but of significantly larger magnitude in 
counties with  more  than  10,000 residents. F-tests demonstrate that 
effects of jurisdictions per 1,000 capita and per $I ,000,000 expenditure 
are significantly different across county population classes in all equa- 
tions with  the exception  of that for changes in  long-term debt. With 
this exception, effects of all three jurisdiction measures simultaneously 
differ significantly  across classes as well.  These results  suggest that 
the interactions between jurisdictional structure and county size are a 
promising topic for further study. 
The results of this section suggest that both fragmentation of market 
power  and  consolidation  of  service provision  reduce  local  debt and 
expenditure income shares. Within states, holding constant population 
characteristics and the array of  available local  services, they suggest 
that the local public sector expands when governments command enough 
economic resources to confer some degree of monopoly power on their 
officials.  It contracts when governments with  large-scale  efficiencies 
provide local public services. 
3.5  Types of Jurisdictions and Aggregate County Public Finance 
The results of the previous section describe the effects ofjurisdiction 
numbers on income shares of local public sector debt, debt changes, 
and expenditures. As noted  in section 3.2, local governments are of 
three types; general-purpose municipalities, single-purpose special dis- 
tricts, and single-purpose school districts. This section describes the 
differences and  similarities  between  local  government types in  their 
effects on local public-sector income shares. 
The equation specifications  of table 3.3, with  linear terms in juris- 
diction counts, jurisdictions  per  1,000 capita, and per $1,000,000 ex- 
penditures for all three jurisdiction types, estimate the effects of local 
government  types on the size of the local public  sector.I4 F-tests in- 
dicate that the effects of municipalities, special districts, and school 
districts, as counts or normalized by 1,000 capita or $1,000,000 expen- 
ditures, on gross debt, net debt, change in long-term debt, nonguar- 
anteed  debt,  short-term  debt,  and  fund  holdings  are  statistically 
indistinguishable.  Is 
These similarities imply that special districts are responsible for the 
recent explosion of nonguaranteed local public debt only through their 
numbers, and not through any special facility. Municipalities have been 
successful at issuing nonguaranteed debt on their own accounts, with- 
out the intervention of a special district. Furthermore, the recent growth 
of special districts has probably not increased total debt income shares 
by more than would have similar growth in municipalities. 
However, F-tests in table 3.7  demonstrate that effects of jurisdiction 
types on guaranteed debt, fiscal-year changes in short-term debt, and 94  Jeffrey S. Zax 






Guaranteed  1982 Fiscal  Total 
Debt  Year  Expenditures 
Cities and towns in 
Special districts in county 
county 
School districts in county 
Cities and towns per  I,OOO 
Special districts per 1.000 




Cities and towns per 
Special districts per 
School districts per 
R2 
$1,OOO,OOO  expenditures 
$I ,000.OOO  expenditures 
$I,OOO,OOO  expenditures 
F-tests und degrees of 
freedom for: 
Equality between city and 
special district effects 
(3,3036) 
Equality between city and 
school district effects 
(3,3036) 
Equality between special 
and school district 
effects (3,3036) 
Equality between city, 
special, and school 
district effects (6,3036) 
-  .000287 
(.457) 




-  ,000275 
(4.20) 
-  ,00956 
(.635) 
(.282) 
-  ,00688 
-  .0684 
(4.09) 














(I  20) 
-  .00000727 
(.24S) 
(.701) 
-  ,0000492 
.00399 
(3.85) 
~  ,000649 
(.645) 
(.241) 
-  ,000392 















-  .000803 
(2.00) 
-  .OW214 
(.753) 























Note; t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficients. Significance levels are in paren- 
theses below F-tests. F-tests test for joint equality between coefficients for number of 
jurisdictions, jurisdictions per 1,000 capita, and jurisdictions per $I ,OOO,OOO  across two 
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total  expenditures differ  at  significant  or  near-significant  levels.  I6 
Municipalities are entirely responsible for income shares of full-faith- 
and-credit  debt and for fiscal-year changes in  short-term debt. Total 
expenditures are equally sensitive to numbers of school and special 
districts, but significantly more sensitive to numbers of municipalities. 
Table 3.7 presents the coefficients on jurisdiction counts, jurisdic- 
tions  per  1,000 capita, and per $1,000,000 expenditures, by  type of 
jurisdiction, from regression models for these three variables. 1-statistics 
for coefficients in equations for guaranteed debt and changes in short 
term debt demonstrate that neither special nor school districts have 
any significant effects on either.” The effects of cities and towns are 
similar to the effects of total jurisdictions in table 3.5. Income shares 
of guaranteed  debt increase with municipalities  per 1,000 capita, and 
diminish with  municipalities  per $1,000,000 expenditures. Effects on 
changes in short-term debt are similar, with the addition of a positive 
effect of city numbers. 
In contrast, municipalities, special districts, and school districts all 
have significant effects on the income share of total expenditures. Each 
type of government has effects similar to those of total jurisdictions in 
table 3.5. However, F-tests of equality across jurisdictions reject the 
hypotheses that effects of municipalities are equal to those of special 
or school districts. Coefficients for municipalities are nearly twice as 
large as those for school districts, and three times the size of those for 
special districts. 
Where jurisdiction types differ in their effects on the size of the local 
public sector, the incentives presented by consolidation and fragmen- 
tation operate most  strongly on general-purpose  governments. They 
may be constitutionally more flexible, because their responsibility for 
multiple functions gives them an additional dimension along which to 
adjust  to changes in  local government structure. They may  also be 
more sensitive to voters, if  elections for single-purpose governments 
attract less voter interest than do municipal elections. Regardless of 
explanation,  the  income  share of  local public expenditures expands 
most when municipalities have large budgets, and diminshes most when 
they serve large populations. This is an additional topic which deserves 
further study. 
3.6  Multiple Jurisdictions and City Finances 
The previous sections  demonstrate that the aggregates of local public 
debt and expenditures depend on the hierarchical  structure of local 
government. This implies that debt and expenditures in individual ju- 
risdictions should depend on the numbers of surrounding jurisdictions 
as well. This section presents a preliminary investigation of these spill- 96  Jeffrey S. Zax 
over effects among cities with populations greater than 10,000. Despite 
differences in  structure and in sample, debt and expenditure income- 
share regressions for cities yield results which are similar to those for 
county aggregates. 
The Census of  Govemmenrs, 1982, Finance Summary Statistics Tape 
File A, and the Census of  Population and Housing, 1980, Summary 
Tape Files 1C and 3C, report complete data for 2,796 general-purpose 
governments,I8 each with populations greater than 10,000. Only 1,066 
of the counties analyzed above contain cities of this size. The counties 
represented in this city sample are a subsample of the sample above, 
comprising, naturally, the biggest counties. The counties in which these 
cities are located contain, on average, approximately  31.8 cities and 
towns, 33.7 special districts, and 20.7 school districts. 
In principle, comparisons of public finances across these cities are 
more difficult than across counties, because they should control for 
differences in service arrays across overlapping special districts, school 
districts, and counties as well  as across the cities under study. The 
analysis here controls only for differences in the service arrays provided 
by the cities themselves. It consists of regression equations similar to 
those of  tables 3.3 and 3.5, with city-specific population and housing 
measures, and various measures of city density within counties. 
The regressions of table 3.8 include two measures of city density for 
each city, the numbers of  large and small cities in the same county. 
Large cities are those in this sample; small cities are all cities not in 
this sample. The number of  large cities is defined as the number of 
cities in this sample that are located in the same county. The number 
of small cities is the difference between the number of large cities and 
the total number of cities in that county.19 
The debt and expenditure income-share regressions of table 3.8 yield 
results which are both similar to, and extensions of, those for county 
aggregates.*O  As with the number of jurisdictions in table 3.3, the num- 
ber of small cities has negative effects on all  debt measures and on 
total expenditures. These effects are significant at 5 percent for gross 
debt and total expenditures, at 10 percent for net debt and changes in 
long-term debt. 
In contrast, the number of large cities has positive effects on all three 
debt measures,  though no effect on expenditures. This result is not 
consistent with  the purported  advantages of  either consolidation or 
fragmentation. It may well be attributable to uncontrolled differences 
in the services provided by  other levels of local government. 
Table 3.9 presents a regression specification similar to that of table 3.5. 
This specification includes linear and quadratic terms in cities per 1,000 
county population and cities per $1,000,000 aggregate local public sec- 
tor expenditures in  the county, as well  as counts of large and small 97  Jurisdiction Types and Numbers, and Local Public Finance 
Table 3.8  Equations for Municipality Debt and Total Expenditure Shares in 
Total Personal Income with Jurisdiction Counts 
Change, 
Gross  Net  City  Total 
Independent  City  City  Long-term  City 
Variables  Debt  Debt  Debt  Expenditure 
Number of large cities in 
county 
Number of small cities in 
county 
lnterquartile range, family 
income distribution 
Marginal federal income 
tax rate 
Marginal federal income 
tax rate, squared 
Marginal state income tax 
rate 
Marginal state income tax 
rate, squared 
Percentage of  adult 
population aged 25-44 
Percentage of adult 
population aged 61 or 
more 
Percentage in same house 
as 1975 
Percentage in same 
county, different house 
as 1975 
Percentage in rental units 
Percentage structures 
Included in an SMSA 
built since 1975 
Intercept 
R2 










-  2.49 




(I  .53) 
-  .0884 
(.455) 
-  .205 
(I  .08) 
,0576 
(.596) 































(  ,907) 














-  .00040S 
(I 30) 
.0000005 1 
(I  .02) 
,667 
(I  .25) 
-  1.16 
(I .74) 
2.54 
(I  .52) 
(I  .45) 
- 12.9 
-  ,0133 
(. 140) 
(.653) 




-  ,00953 











-  .OW172 




-  ,0969 
(.512) 




-  8.99 
(2.85) 
-  .0555 
(I  .65) 
















Note: r-statistics are in parentheses. All equations have 3,043 degrees of freedom. 
cities. Coefficients for large and small city measures are similar to those 
in table 3.8. 
Effects of other city density measures replicate the analogous effects 
in table 3.5. All linear and quadratic coefficients are significant, most 
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Table 3.9  Equations for Municipality Debt and Total Expenditure Shares in 






Number of large cities in 
Number of small cities in 
Cities per 1  ,OOO  capita 
county 
county 
Cities per 1.000 capita, 
squared 
Cities per $1 ,OOO,OOO 
expenditures 
Cities per $l,OOO,OOO 
expenditures, squared 
lnterquartile range, family 
income distribution 
Marginal federal income 
tax rate 
Marginal federal income 
tax rate, squared 
Marginal state income tax 
rate 
Marginal state income tax 
rate, squared 
Percentage of adult 
population aged 25-44 
Percentage of adult 
population aged 61 or 
more 
Percentage in same house 
as 1975 
Percentage in same 
county, different house 
as 1975 
Percentage in rental units 
Percentage structures 
Included in  an SMSA 








-  I .38. 
(2.97) 






(I  .24) 




-  .0644 
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.00000  I 1 
-  2.45 
-  27.2 
-  .005  10 
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Net  City  Total 
City  Long-term  City 
Debt  Debt  Expenditure 
,000654 
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per capita in the county increases the share of individual city debt and 
expenditures in the income of its residents at a diminishing rate. In- 
creasing the number of cities per local government expenditure reduces 
the income share of city debt and expenditures at a diminishing rate. 
These results reaffirm the simultaneous advantages of fragmentation 
and consolidation.  The income shares of city finances increase with 
reductions in  the population  served, and fall  with  reductions in city 
market share. However, they also suggest that spillovers among large 
cities involve other considerations  as  well. These spillovers, which may 
also occur among counties, merit further investigation. 
3.7  Conclusion 
The recent scholarly literature on  jurisdiction numbers has been pre- 
dominantly hostile towards consolidation and to consolidationist  ad- 
vocacy. This attitude is unfair for two reasons. First, the advocates of 
consolidation have become relatively inactive. They were most active 
and influential at a time when school districts were far more numerous, 
and their position was correspondingly more persuasive. 
Second, empirical demonstrations, in  selected samples, of the ad- 
vantages of competitive  local governments have not  allowed for the 
possibility  that large-scale production  and  distribution  may  also be 
advantageous. The results here demonstrate that, across all counties 
in the country, jurisdiction  numbers have negative effects on size of 
the local  public  sector when  model  specifications do not  allow  for 
simultaneous  measures of  competition  and efficiency. These results 
suggest that, when they do, both the restraining influence of compe- 
tition among jurisdictions, and the efficiencies of scale play a role in 
reducing the shares of local government debt and expenditures in ag- 
gregate income. 
Debt  and  expenditures are minimized  by  simultaneously  reducing 
jurisdiction market shares and expanding jurisdiction coverage. A sys- 
tem which  depends wholly  on general-purpose governments cannot 
exploit both mechanisms. Fragmentation means more competition and 
more redundancy, consolidation means more efficiency and more mo- 
nopoly power. 
Though numbers of single-purpose governments have smaller effects 
on expenditures than do  numbers of municipalities, single-purpose gov- 
ernments may still play an important role in minimizing the size of the 
local public sector. If they are constructed to serve large, though not 
monopoly, shares of county population, and assigned only small frac- 
tions of total government activity, they may at once achieve both ef- 
ficiency and competition.  A complex system of local government which 
relies on them, judiciously,  may provide local  public services at less 100  Jeffrey S. Zax 
current and future expense than can the simple systems of either con- 
solidation or fragmentation. 
Notes 
1.  Curiously, authors in  this tradition  perceive  it  to be the position  of  a 
distinct minority. Wagner and Weber (1975), Martin and McKenzie (1975), and 
Wikstrom (1978) are examples. 
2. The Census of Population, I980 identifies 3,137. The Census of  Govern- 
ments, 1982  identifies 3,132.  The intersection  between these two data sets 
contains 3,131 county-level governments. Among these are Washington, D.C. 
and New York City, whose government structures are unique. Omitting them, 
the sample for this paper is composed of 3,129 counties. For brevity, this paper 
refers to individual county-level governments as “counties,”  though a few are 
legally boroughs, townships, or independent cities. 
3. County populations vary widely. The Census of Population, I980 reports 
that 25  counties had fewer than  1,000 inhabitants  in  1980. Loving County, 
Texas, had only 91. At the same time, 25 counties had more than 1,000,000 
inhabitants. Los Angeles, with 7,477,503 was the most populous. 
4. Gordon and Slemrod (1986) and Mieszkowski (1986) agree that debt is 
appropriate finance for municipal  activities only if  municipal  debt presents 
favorable opportunities for arbitrage, relative to combinations of tax financing 
and private debt. Nevertheless, the structure and number of jurisdictions may 
affect debt levels. Directly, fragmentation may create homogeneous districts 
in which electorates are uniform in their preferencs with regard to arbitrage 
opportunities. This effect may imply either higher or lower debt levels. Under 
consolidation, monopolizing bureaucrats may take advantage of the opportu- 
nities at all margins to  enlarge government size. They may therefore issue debt 
beyond the limits imposed by profitable arbitration. 
5. The Census ofGovernrnents, 1982 surveys 31 government functions. Nine 
functions occur in at least 99 percent of all counties. In the regression equations 
below, these functions are not represented by explicit dummy variables.  In- 
stead, their effects are captured in the intercept term. 
6. The Census of  Population and Housing, 1980. Summary Tape Files 1C 
and 3C provide the measures of  population characteristics, housing charac- 
teristics and the SMSA  dummy used in this model. The Census of Governments, 
1982, Finance Summary Statistics Tape File B is the source for the function 
dummies, the debt and expenditure statistics used  here.  Tape File A is the 
source for the jurisdiction counts. 
The specific representation  of marginal tax rates here differs from that in 
Gordon and Slemrod. The equations below include linear and quadratic terms 
in both marginal federal and marginal state income tax rates. Tax Foundation’s 
Facts and Figures on Government Finance, 1983 is the source for 1982 federal 
rates. State rates are a linear interpolation of 1982 rates given in Feenberg and 
Rosen (1986).  Rate values are estimated as the marginal rates applicable to 
median family incomes by county, as reported in  the Census of  Popularion 
and Housing, 1980. 
7. The Borcherding/Deacon and Bergstrom/Goodman  models are linear in 
logarithms, with expenditures as the dependent variable, and population and 101  Jurisdiction Types and Numbers, and Local Public Finance 
income among the independent variables. Here, population and income appear 
in the denominator of the dependent expenditure measure. Logarithmic ex- 
penditure equations for this sample of counties yield  standard values for pa- 
rameter estimates. 
Borcherding/Deacon and Bergstrom/Goodman measure tax-share as the per- 
centage of total property taxes attributable  to estimated property taxes on 
homes of median value. They choose the property tax measure because prop- 
erty taxes constitute more than half of own-source revenue in  1962, the year 
from which  their data are drawn. As they recognize,  assumptions that the 
median voter has median income, and that the median income person owns a 
home of median value, effectively make their tax-share variable a function of 
income. In the expenditure models below, tax-share is an explicit function of 
income. In 1982, all taxes constitute only49  percent of local government own- 
source revenue. 
8. These regressions include only county-level governments in both the 1977 
and 1982 Census of Government, with nonzero counts for the relevant gov- 
ernment type: 3,108 for cities, 1,169 for towns, 2,843 for special districts, and 
3,108 for school districts. Regressions that include all 3,108 available counties 
achieve identical results. Complete results are available from the author. 
9. The performance of these debt equations is  similar to those in Gordon 
and Slemrod (1986), although of lower explanatory power. However, they do 
not replicate the effects of income taxation on gross and net debt. Both federal 
and state marginal income tax rates are insignificant in these equations. Federal 
rates have strongly significant coefficients, and effects similar to those in Gor- 
don and Slemrod, if the specification here omits the interquartile range of the 
family income distribution. This comparison suggests that the effects estimated 
by Gordon and Slemrod may be partially attributable to uncontrolled hetero- 
geneity in population demands for public  services. State marginal tax rates 
often have  significant  effects,  similar to those of federal rates, in  equations 
which omit state dummies. 
10. Sjoquist (1982) reports a similar negative relationship between  jurisdiction 
numbers and 1972 per capita expenditures for 48 SMSAs  in the south, using 
a logarithmic specification which omits controls for state, function, and pop- 
ulation characteristics. 
11. Coefficients for the other explanatory variables are virtually invariant to 
different jurisdiction measures. In the expenditure equation, total expenditures 
are the denominator of the jurisdictions per $1,000,000 expenditures variable 
on the right hand side of the equation, as well as  the numerator in the dependent 
variable. Therefore, this equation  should be taken as illustrative rather than 
conclusive. This problem is analogous to that confronting regressions of rates 
of  return  on market shares. Jurisdictions  measured relative to lagged total 
expenditures would probably yield similar results. 
12. Schneider (1986) reports a contrary result; suburban governments per 
100,000  SMSA  population have a significant negative linear effect on total 1977 
expenditures and 1972 expenditures for common functions. His sample is 757 
suburban municipalities in only 46 SMSA's. He uses a linear specification which 
omits both state and function dummies. 
13. The complete equations discussed in this and the next two paragraphs 
are available from the author. 
14.  These equations disaggregate  the jurisdiction  measures of  tables  3.3 
through 3.6. They omit quadratic terms for the different types of local gov- 
ernment in order to simplify comparisons. 102  Jeffrey S. Zax 
15. These equations are available from the author. 
16. These tests are weakened by the inclusion of coefficients for  jurisdiction 
counts. They reject equality across the three government types with  much 
greater significance for jurisdictions per 1,000 capita and per $I ,000,000. 
17. Special districts may be legally prohibited from issuing guaranteed debt. 
18. General-purpose governments are, for this analysis,  all  municipalities 
and towns in the eleven “strong-township”  states (ACIR  1982). For conve- 
nience, they are referred to as cities in the rest of this section. 
19. Quadratic  terms in these variables are omitted because they are invariably 
insignificant. 
20. Function and state dummies contribute substantially more explanatory 
power in city than in county regressions. In consequence, debt equations for 
cities have similar explanatory power to those for counties, though population 
variables appear less significant. Expenditure equations for cities attain sub- 
stantially higher RZs  than those for counties. 
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Comment  Alan J. Auerbach 
An important, if  overlooked, aspect of fiscal federalism is the impact 
of local government structure on the level and pattern of local public 
spending. Jeffrey Zax seeks to improve our understanding in this area 
by estimating the impact of different measures of jurisdictional  frag- 
mentation on the nature of government behavior.  Zax’s basic unit of 
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observation is the county, and he tests his hypotheses on a sample that 
includes essentially every county in the United States, over 3,000 of 
them in all. 
Perhaps the first interesting fact revealed in his analysis is the het- 
erogeneity of the sample. Twenty-five counties had fewer than 1,000 
inhabitants  in  1980, while the same number of counties had  over  1 
million people living in them. This leads to my first comment about the 
paper’s  logic.  In  some types of empirical analysis, the unit  of mea- 
surement is fairly obvious or at least subject to a fairly narrow range 
of choices. For example, if we were estimating labor supply functions 
we might choose to concentrate on the family or the individual, and if 
we were looking at investment behavior we would wish to look at the 
firm. But what is the appropriate unit of measurement for a study of 
the effects of governmental fragmentation? 
What Zax appears  to have in mind is ajurisdiction that is small enough 
for a type of Tiebout sorting to occur, but still large enough to have 
lower levels of government within it. But it is not clear that the des- 
ignation “county”  has a very clear or consistent meaning throughout 
the sample.  One would not expect the 91  people  in  Loving County, 
Texas, to organize their lower levels of government to achieve the same 
objectives as the voters of Cook County, Illinois, whose number ex- 
ceeds 5 million even without the inclusion of the deceased. This also 
highlights an econometric problem which the paper partially addresses: 
should these extreme observations be weighted equally, as they cur- 
rently are, or should some account be taken of their very large size 
differences.  At  present, anomalous behavior of a few small govern- 
ments could lead to estimates that would offer a poor description of 
the behavior of county governments representing most citizens. Even 
though the results are reported not to change when very small (pop- 
ulation below 1,000) and very large (population above 1 million) coun- 
ties are omitted, I would have found a comparison of weighted (by size 
of county) and unweighted regressions informative. 
Let me turn now to the theory that underlies the paper. If one were 
designing a local jurisdictional  structure within  a county, one would 
face offsetting costs and benefits of the sort commonly encountered in 
questions of local public goods provision. On the one hand, the larger 
the number of governments, the greater their ability  to respond  to 
differences in tastes among constituents. On the other hand, such small 
governments might also face greater costs if  their level of operation 
were below the minimum efficient scale. To this familiar trade-off be- 
tween the satisfaction  of  heterogeneous tastes and the efficiency  of 
provision, Zax adds the question of competition, arguing that counties 
with fewer  jurisdictions, per some measure of county size, will lead to 
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While one might  attempt to characterize the optimal  structure of 
government in  such a  model, Zax  takes governmental structure as 
exogenous and instead  estimates the impact of such structural vari- 
ations on public expenditure and debt levels. Because he has not mod- 
eled the optimal behavior of governments, I  am somewhat confused 
by the normative terminology he uses in describing his empirical find- 
ings. In section 3.1, for example, he equates the minimization of debt 
and expenditure with superior performance. Since most citizens would 
desire some positive  levels of public  spending on education, police, 
and  fire protection, even if  provided  by  inefficient and  oligopolistic 
governments, Zax’s comments suggest the view  that government is 
inherently biased toward the overprovision of public goods. 
The assumption of exogenous government structure is also a problem 
when one attempts to interpret the empirical results. For simultaneity 
bias to be avoided, it is necessary that the variations in governmental 
structure be independent of the population characteristics. Generally, 
however, one might expect that counties inhabited by people with a 
strong taste for public goods might find it sensible to establish more 
governments per capita in  order to supply these goods. This would 
predict a positive sign if  one regressed expenditures on the number of 
jurisdictions  per capita, as Zax  indeed  finds  empirically  in  the last 
column of table 3.4, without in any way suggesting inefficiency in the 
scale of governmental operation, which is the interpretation Zax gives 
to this result. Zax supports the exogeneity assumption with evidence 
that jurisdiction  counts in  1982 are almost perfectly predictable using 
1977 counts alone. If, however, local taste differences are a long-run 
phenomenon, there may still be a problem of simultaneity bias. I believe 
this may be a serious problem, but will say no more about it. 
Let me turn now to the empirical relations that Zax estimates. There 
are many results reported, so I must be selective in my comments. He 
constructs a number of measures of each county’s local government 
characteristics, and includes these along with other demographic vari- 
ables in cross-sectional regressions to explain the ratios of aggregate 
government debt and public expenditures to total personal income in 
the county.  I  will  focus on the equations that explain  variations  in 
expenditures, because I  am less sure how to interpret the equations 
for government debt in the context of Zax’s model. 
There are several variables constructed to characterize government 
fragmentation. These include the number of all local jurisdictions and 
different types of such  jurisdictions (such as cities and towns and school 
districts) per county, per thousand residents, and per million dollars of 
public expenditures, as well as the number of jurisdictions per square 
mile. Let me first summarize Zax’s findings concerning these variables. 
In table 3.3, the number of local jurisdictions per county is found 106  Jeffrey S. Zax 
over most of  the relevant range (the variable also enters in quadratic 
form so that the overall effect decreases and eventually switches sign 
with the variable’s size) to have a significantly negative effect on ex- 
penditures per dollar of income, which Zax interprets as showing that 
fragmentation leads to competitive behavior. In table 3.4, we find that 
the number ofjurisdictions per capita increases total expenditures while 
the number of jurisdictions per dollar of expenditure decreases expen- 
ditures, which are interpreted as showing that governments with small 
constituencies are inefficient but that governments with small budgets 
behave competitively. I see several dficulties with these interpretations. 
First of all, why should population be a better measure of  scale of 
operations than budget size? Second, why put one measure of  frag- 
mentation in  table 3.3 and the others in  table 3.4, if  all are supposed 
to matter? Third, since government expenditures enter in the numerator 
of the dependent variable and the denominator of one of the explanatory 
variables, one would  expect a negative sign on this variable even if 
jurisdictional structure were totally irrelevant to the determination of 
public spending levels.  Finally, increased inefficiency would lead to 
higher spending levels only if  the price elasticity of demand for the 
public goods is less than one in absolute value. Likewise, though a less 
competitive government might increase the price of government ser- 
vices, one might expect total expenditure on public goods to decline; 
a monopolist, for example, restricts output to the point at which mar- 
ginal revenue equals a positive marginal cost. 
In table 3.7, Zax divides the local jurisdictions into cities and towns, 
special districts, and school districts and repeats the analysis of  table 
3.4. He finds the same signs as before for each of  the three types of 
jurisdictions: that the number of jurisdictions per capita increases ex- 
penditures while the number per dollar of  expenditure decreases ex- 
penditures. It is interesting, howver, that the effects are much larger 
for cities and towns than for the other two measures. Zax does not 
really come up with a convincing explanation for this finding. I don’t 
have one, either, but would suggest a closer examination of the pattern 
and frequency of these different forms of government in different parts 
of the country. My guess is that there is considerable variation in the 
use of  special districts across different parts of  the country and ac- 
cording to population density. 
There are many other interesting results in this paper. I think that 
Jeffrey  Zax  has attacked  a very  complicated  and difficult question. 
Many of the problems I have suggested are really a necessary byproduct 
of the decision to undertake such an ambitious task. Nevertheless, I 
think a tighter theoretical foundation and greater attention to certain 
econometric difficulties could yield  substantial returns in  helping us 
understand  the  full implications of  these interesting and  suggestive 
results. 